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Abstract 
Prior to digitalisation, the vertical structure of the market for recorded 
music could be described as a large number of creators (composers, 
lyricists and musicians)supplying creative expressions to a small number 
of larger record labels and publishers. These funded, produced, and 
marketed the resulting recorded music to subsequently sodl these works 
to consumers through a fragmented retail sector. We argue that 
digitalisation has led to a new structure in which the retail segment has 
also become concentrated. Such a structure, with successive oligopolistic 
segments, can lead to higher consumer prices through double 
marginalisation. We further question whether a combination of 
disintermediation of the record labels function combined with ‘self-
publishing’ by creators, will lead to the demise of powerful firms in the 
record label segment. If so, this would shift market power from the record 
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label and publisher segment to the retail segment (and new 
intermediaries such as ISPs), rather than increasing the number of 
segments with market power. 
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1 Introduction 
Before digitalisation, the vertical structure of the market for recorded music 
could roughly be described as a large number of creators (composers, lyricists 
and musicians)supplying creative expressions to a small and decreasing 
number of larger record labels and publishers. These funded, produced, and 
marketed the resulting recorded music and subsequently sold this to consumers 
through a fragmented retail sector.1To use the description of Richard Caves, the 
record labels and publishers acted as the centre of gravity of a nexus of 
contracts, controlling the production of consumed music.2 Being at the centre of 
contracting, record labels and publishers project managed production, bore 
most of the risks, and in return, gained rewards as residual claimants of the 
stream of revenues generated. In other creative industries, most notably book 
publishing, (a) digitalisation has led to increased concentration at the retail 
level, (b) a possible reduction in concentration through disintermediation in 
other intermediate levels and (c) a potential shift in the centre of gravity of 
contracts towards creators trading directly through the on-line retailers.3 In this 
paper, we demonstrate that for the first two, similar observations can be made 
in the music industry. However, in contrast with the book industry, music 
labels and producers appear to have maintained their share of the market. 
Increased concentration at the retail level implies the existence 
ofsuccessive oligopolistic segments within the industry. Suchstructure is 
                                                 
1 Alex Solo, ‘The Role of Copyright in an Age of Online Music Distribution’ (2014) 19 Media and 
Arts Law Review, 171. 
2 Richard E. Caves, Creative industries: Contracts between Arts and Commerce”, Harvard 
University Press (2000), chapter 4. 
3 See e.g. Niva Elkin-Koren, “The Changing Nature of Books and the Uneasy Case for 
Copyright”, (2010-2011) 79 George Washington Law Review,101-133and Morten Hviid, Sofia 
Izquierdo Sanchez and Sabine Jacques, “From publishers to self-publishing: The disruptive 
effects of digitalisation on the book industry”, CREATe working paper 2017/06. 
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associated with a concern that consumer prices may be subject to double-
marginalisation, i.e. a situation where the two successive levels add an 
oligopolistic mark-up to their costs, including wholesale costs. This is likely to 
be detrimental to consumers without necessarily benefiting creators. 
Disintermediation, on the other hand, may have the effect that the current 
structure is short-lived because it poses two possible challenges to the power of 
the record labels and publishers. One direct challenge arises from the entry of 
new players offering increased competition. The other comes from the creators 
directly because of the increased availability of the tools necessary for ’self-
publishing‘. This enables creators either to take control directly,by becoming 
the new centre of gravity of contracts, or to threaten to do so to strengthen their 
bargaining position during negotiations. In this regard, it is beneficial that 
major retailers, such as Amazon, are used to dealing with small independent 
retailers and sometimes even individual sellers. A better understanding of the 
developments in the structure of this industry will help us predict future effects 
on both creators and consumers. As copyright is another major driver shaping 
creative industries, a key element of this paper is to provide an appreciation of 
the effects of and recent developments in this area.  
Throughout the paper we have tried to identify relevant data. Finding 
(consistent) data on variables, such as market shares, is surprisingly hard. What 
we do find is that, while there are some features in common with what can be 
observed in the market for books, there are also important differences. As with 
books, the retail sector has become dominated by a small number of firms. 
Those creating music have available internet services which enable them to 
produce and even retail their own music without going through the traditional 
channels of record labels, publishers and collecting societies. In contrast to the 
book industry, the market shares, in particular of digital music, of the top-3 
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largest record labels have remained more or less constant, possibly due to the 
complexities of the exploration of copyright within the music industry.    
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a contextual 
background by describing the evolution in consumers’ habits. Section 3 focuses 
on the legal framework surrounding creation and commercialisation of music. 
Section 4 discusses the evolution in the market structure in the music industry. 
Finally, section 5 offers some brief conclusions. 
2 The role of digitalisation on recorded music 
It is commonly accepted that the digital age has changed everything in terms of 
music experience. With digital music, we saw the decline of physical mediums 
on which music was recorded and an increase in types of devices on which 
music could be played.  
While the CD was the first medium on which one could store digital 
music, the big leap was the creation of the MP3 file format, which compressed 
the file size of a recording without noticeable loss in quality. The real effect of 
this was not fully realised until the introduction of portable devices such as 
MP3 players and iPods, enabling consumption of music wherever the listener 
was located.4 
Early versions of mp3 players had rather limited capacity and was only 
able to hold a small number of songs.  The iPod first generation, launched in 
2001, was a huge improvement on other mp3 players. iTunes does not use mp3 
encoding but songs are encoded in Advanced Audio Coding (AAC) format, 
superior to mp3.5  Where the first mp3 players could hold roughly 12 tracks, the 
first generation of iPods could store up to 5 GB worth of mp3 files (i.e. roughly 
                                                 
4 This mirrors the rapid take-up of e-books once suitable devices had been developed.  
5 See https://www.diffen.com/difference/AAC_vs_MP3. 
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1,000 tracks). Theseportable devices have subsequently been constantly 
improved and today, in addition to much larger storage capacity, include 
numerous improvements like a high-quality screen capable of playing videos 
and a powerful processor. Whilst mp3 continued to evolve, new ways of 
listening to music emerged. Today, consumers listen to music on other portable 
devices such as smartphones, tablets or even watches. 
2.1 Platforms and peer-to-peer file sharing 
The creation of compressed digital files made delivering music over the internet 
a commercially viable possibility. The launch of the Apple iTunes Music Store 
in 2003 was the start of a new business model in which digital delivery, through 
the purchase and download of albums and individual tracks, was the product 
on offer. This helped catapult iTunes to the forefront of the music distribution 
business, making it the largest music distributor in the world since 2010. Other 
web-based retailers followed, making use of the increased number of devices 
capable of playing music.  
The number of downloads initially grew rapidly, outstripping sales of 
CDs and other physical means of consuming music, but have since been 
overtaken by streaming. Music streaming services are broadly speaking 
services which enable the consumer to listen to the music without downloading 
it. Hence, no copy is made on the user’s personal device. Launched in 2005, 
Pandora appears to be the pioneer in music streaming services. This initiative 
tried to revive the Music Genome Project,6 a sophisticated taxonomy of musical 
information database generated by music experts which was then fed into an 
algorithm enabling users to listen to music matching to the user’s tastes. By the 
wealth of the information on the database, Pandora’s search engine enables 
                                                 
6 About the Music Genome Project, see https://www.pandora.com/about/mgp. 
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users to customise their listening experience and discover thousands of songs 
across the world. Pandora might have become a very popular service for 
listeners, however, it became less popular with creators. It is easy to appreciate 
the concerns of creators about a service which enabled users across the world to 
access tens of thousands of works without purchasing tracks or albums. To this 
day, the battle over royalties paid to creators and collecting rights societies 
continues, at least partly due to the large differences in the gross pay-out per 
stream to labels.7 Irrespective of whether pay-per-play undercompensates the 
creators, in terms of economic logic, the move from a share of album sales to a 
pay-per-play remuneration also implies a shift of risk from consumer to creator.  
When buying the album, the consumer took the risk that they might not enjoy 
the album as much as expected, whereas with pay-per-play the creators take the 
risk that the consumer may lose interest in their music.  This makes comparing 
the two scenarios challenging. Not only does one have to allow for potential 
greater revenue from both those who listen a lot and those who listen a little, 
one also have to allow for the impact of the risk premium on sales.  Since 2007, 
Pandora experiences several royalty developments leading to licensing deals 
directly with music publishers such as ASCAP and BMI.8 
Creating a new standard for online music distribution, Pandora was 
followed closely by Spotify which was officially founded in 2006 in Sweden. 
Despite the similar features between Pandora and Spotify,9 these two streaming 
services differ in various ways. Spotify was classified as an interactive service 
                                                 
7 Recent data from Statista illustrate the source of this. While Pandora pay $0.00134 per stream 
and Spotify pay $0.00397 per stream, Xbox pay as much as $0.02730 per stream. At the same 
time, Pandora and Spotify have a combined market share of 69.4%, see 
https://www.statista.com/chart/13407/music-streaming_-who-pays-best/. See also section 3.2 
below. 
8 See section 4.3 below. 
9 Spotify secures two types of licenses: mechanical rights and public performance rights. 
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and Pandora as a non-interactive service (closer to radio), which has 
consequences on the licensing scheme applicable.10 For example, Spotify’s 
music catalogue is about 20 times larger than Pandora’s, making Spotify ‘the 
gold standard’ among streaming services.11However, probably due to the 
sophisticated Music Genome Project, Pandora remains the reference point for 
music discovery.  
The arrival of streaming services went one step further in connecting 
users. Both Pandora and Spotify provide their users with the ability to connect 
with friends, share music they like and recommend either tracks or entire 
playlists to other users. Nevertheless, streaming services do not provide 
identical social features. In this category, Spotify is superior to Pandora as it 
provides a real possibility for users to interact with their friends by allowing 
them to share music via social media websites such as Facebook, Twitter or 
Tumblr but also via Spotify’s own messaging application. Finally, Spotify offers 
the possibility for users to collaborate and create playlists together. Today, 
other streaming services have emerged such as iHeartRadio, iTunes music, 
Google Play, Rhapsody and other new names keep entering the market, e.g. 
Tidal, Deezer, Amazon Prime Music, Amazon Music Unlimited 
andSoundCloud. Data from June 2017 suggests that Spotify remains the most 
popular subscription service,12 with 40% of the market, followed by Apple 
Music (19%) and Amazon (12%).13 
                                                 
10 See section 4.2 below. 
11See http://www.digitaltrends.com/music/spotify-vs-pandora/. 
12 Recently, Spotify announced its wish to be listed as a public company, where its direct 
competitors will be Apple Music and Amazon Music. 
https://www.theguardian.com/music/2018/apr/04/spotify-public-listing-ambition-struggling-
musicians-stock-market (last access date 13/05/2018). 
13https://musicindustryblog.wordpress.com/2017/07/14/amazon-is-now-the-3rd-biggest-music-
subscription-service/.  
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Alongside these applications, video-sharing websites started to stream 
music. Founded in 2005 by PayPal employees, YouTube quickly became the 
world’s most important online video portal. Ever since its purchase by Google 
in 2006, YouTube also became the world’s second largest search engine, 
catapulting the online sharing platform to the forefront of online distribution 
channels. Furthermore in 2015, YouTube developed its own music app, 
YouTube Music, aimedat enabling users to search only for music-related 
results. By the end of 2017, YouTube had signed agreements with the three 
major record labels to share revenue,in addition to agreements previously 
reached with collecting Rights Societies, such as PRS for Music in 2016.14 
YouTube is planning to introduce a subscriptions service in 2018 by combining 
Google Play Music and YouTube Red.15In an attempt to please right-holders, 
YouTube has announced its intention to ‘force’ long lasting listeners to 
subscribe to its paid music service by impeding their experience and pestering 
with more ads than the casual YouTube user.  
From different directions, the services all appear to travel towards 
subscription-based streaming.16 Whether this is the new long-run equilibrium 
remains to be seen. It is notable that previous digital products such as CDs and 
downloads, have grown rapidly only to peak and then to decline (vinyl appears 
to be the odd one out as a medium which is growing again as it becomes 
                                                 
14 See PRS press release, https://www.prsformusic.com/press/2016/prs-for-music-and-youtube-
announce-extension-to-multi-territory-licensing-deal (last access date 16/02/2018). 
15https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-07/youtube-is-said-to-plan-new-music-
subscription-service-for-march; https://www.spin.com/2018/03/youtube-streaming-
subscription-plan/ 
16 Which can be explained by the changes in the legal framework as more and more, 
intermediaries are being held responsible for the content shared on their platforms (i.e. 
YouTube). See S. Jacques, K. Garstka, M. Hviid & J. Street, ‘Automated anti-piracy systems 
as copyright enforcement mechanism: a need to consider cultural diversity’ (2018) 40(4) 
EIPR 218-229. 
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collectable).17 The growth rate of streaming, particularly for subscription-based 
streaming is more dramatic and arguably driven by the nature of current 
competition. In the IFPI 2017 report, Spotify’s Economics director, Will Page, 
noted: ’What is especially key is that it is competition based around market 
growing, not market stealing. There are more big players - and arguably more 
sustainable players - than have come and gone in the past, and it’s all about 
making new audiences aware of streaming and expanding the market’.18 
Streaming services differ across a number of characteristics, raising 
several questions. Does the consumer view radio, non-interactive streaming 
(e.g. Pandora) and interactive (e.g. Spotify) streaming as close substitutes? From 
the consumer perspective, a key difference between non-interactive and 
interactive streaming is that for the former, users do not control the songs 
played next (mimicking radio broadcast) and for the latter users choose the 
tracks which are played.19 Where should one place video-sharing websites such 
as YouTube which feature licensed music as well as other content, included 
user-generated videos? Other differences relate to ’payment’: freemium + 
advertising or subscription-based business models. The services historically 
relied on advertising to generate revenue (e.g. YouTube or ad-funded Spotify), 
but have slowly but increasingly introduced subscription models.20 Individual 
services are further differentiated in terms of shared playlists and algorithmic 
suggestions. In this regard, YouTube has been growing exponentially, leading 
                                                 
17https://musicbusinessresearch.wordpress.com/2017/07/30/the-uk-recorded-music-market-in-a-
long-term-perspective-1975-2016/ 
18IFPI 2017 report [http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/GMR2017.pdf, p. 17. 
19Subsection 114(j)(6) and (7)of the Copyright Act,17 U.S.C. 
20 This push is fuelled not only by the music industry but also by companies wanting to 
advertise on these platforms. See https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/unilever-threatens-to-
reduce-ad-spending-on-tech-platforms-that-dont-combat-divisive-content-
1518398578?__twitter_impression=true 
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to a battle between the music industry and YouTube to ensure fair 
remuneration.21 
The developments in the mode and cost of the delivery of music, made 
possible by digitalisation, has created a small set of new downstream retailers 
and potentially removes some of the scale arguments for the concentration 
among labels, publishers and collecting societies. On their own, these 
changeswould be expected to lead to significant changes in industry structure. 
However, the power of these developments to change structure depends, at 
least to some extent, on the rules provided by the copyright framework. In the 
next section we summarise this framework to illustrate that it still favours the 
traditional intermediaries who are able to spread the transaction cost of 
managing the framework across the output of creators and artists. 
3 The legal aspects 
Intellectual property rights, and especially copyright, underpins the economic 
framework used in the music industry. By conferring a bundle of rights to 
right-holders, creators can license their works in the UK and around the world, 
and generate revenue to incentivise investment in creating new creative 
content. Digitalisation and the growth of the Internet has fundamentally 
transformed the way we access and listen to music but it also has and continue 
to require the music sector to constantly reinvent itself to extract revenues from 
the emerging services and platforms while shielding copyright-protected works 
from copyright infringement. Given the central role of copyright in the music 
industry, this section will give an overview of some of the key copyright 
principles applicable in the UK.  
                                                 
21 See, http://www.completemusicupdate.com/article/the-lovehate-relationships-continues-as-
prs-renews-its-deal-with-youtube/ 
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3.1 Copyright and the multi-layering of rights 
In the UK, the copyright regime is governed by the Copyright, Designs 
and Patents Act 198822, as well as EU directives23 and international treaties24. If 
a person creates a song (the composition), copyright can subsist in the lyrics 
(literary work) and the music (musical work) provided these works are 
original25, in addition to existing in any material form.26 The first copyright 
owners of this composition are generally its creators.27 But a song which has 
been recorded can also attract a separate copyright protection, referred to as an 
‘entrepreneurial work’ in UK legislation.28In contrast with copyright vested in 
authorial works, the first copyright holder of an entrepreneurial work is the 
record producer.29 
                                                 
22 1988 c. 48. 
23Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26February 2014 on 
collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of 
rights in musical works for online use in the internal market, Official Journal L 84, 20.3.2014, 
72–98; Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8/06/ 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the 
Internal Market ('Directive on electronic commerce'), Official Journal L 178, 17.7.2000,1–16; 
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, 
Official Journal L 167, 22/06/2001 10 – 19.An important copyright reform is underway, see 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital 
Single MarketCOM(2016)593 final. 
24 Mainly, the Berne convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886 (as 
amended on September 28, 1979); Rome Convention 1961; Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994; WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996; and, WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty 1996. 
25C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v Danske DagbladesForening [2009] ECDR 16. The 
Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd &Ors v Meltwater Holding BV &Ors[2011]EWCACiv 890; 
For more on the originality threshold, see L. Bently and B. Sherman, Intellectual Property 
Law (OUP, 2014) 93-117.  
26 Section 3 CDPA 1988. 
27Section 9 (1) CDPA 1988. There are exceptions to this rule, for example see section 11 CDPA 
1988 (creations made in the course of employment). 
28Also called ‘neighbouring right’ or ‘related right’. Sound recording is to be interpreted in the 
broad sense, covering vinyl record, tapes, CDs, mp3 and other digital file formats. 
29 Section 9 (2) (aa) CDPA 1988. 
First Author Name et al.  13 
These rights are not transferred to the owner of the physical product (e.g. 
CD, mp3 or other digital file), who therefore does not own the copyrights 
embodied within it. Users who purchase a CD lawfully are not entitled to copy 
or communicate its content if they do not own the copyrights in the song. 
However, current technology allows user to easily copy or communicate works 
(whether it is to burn a CD or copy a digital file). This generally constitutes a 
violation of the right-holders’ copyrights. Indeed, once copyright subsists in a 
work, its right-holder is granted a bundle of exclusive30 rights. First, the right-
holder is provided with a set of economic rights31to cover activities such 
ascopying the work, communicating the work to the public, making 
adaptations of this one, issuing copies of the work to the public, performing the 
work in public and broadcast or send cable transmission of the work (which 
have been extended to cover digital transmission), and lending of works to the 
public. These rights are designed to enable the right-holder to extract rent 
which is then dispersed according to contractual arrangements with those 
involved in producing the object for the copyright. The costs and effectiveness 
of this rent extraction may depend on to whom the rights are finally assigned 
to. Secondly, moral rights are granted to authors.32 Essentially in the UK, these 
include the paternity right33 (and the right not to have a work falsely attributed 
to anybody else but its author)34 and the integrity right.35 Unlike economic 
                                                 
30 Exclusivity is an important concept in copyright law which means that no one other than the 
right-holder is allowed to carry out one of the restricted acts set out in section 16 CDPA 1988 
without prior authorisation. 
31 Section 16 CDPA 1988. 
32 For more on moral rights, see Bently and Sherman,supra n. 25, 272-291. 
33 Section 77 CDPA 1988. 
34 Section 84 CDPA 1988. 
35 Section 80 CDPA 1988. 
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rights, the paternityright must be asserted36 and moral rights cannot be 
assigned. However, these can be waived37 and are transferrable upon death. 
Finally, there are performers’ rights. While these rights were initially 
reserved for public performances only,38 the EC Rental Directive39 extended the 
protection to anyone involved in a recording - including both featured and 
session musicians – when licensed for broadcast purposes. This extension of 
rights complicates the production of recorded music because what had 
previously simply been an input into the process which was paid, it is now 
potentially entitled to a stream of income. A consequence of this is that a larger 
group of musicians depend on the success of the recording and hence a group 
who has not previously borne any risk now do. In effect, after the change, more 
of those involved in producing music faced a remuneration based partly on the 
success of the performance.Since this group is getting a deferred, if uncertain, 
income, standard economic logic based on the principal-agent theory40would 
imply that their initial fee or salary would be reduced. By how much depends 
on the size of the risk and their attitude to risk. The greater the risk and the 
more they dislike risk, the greater a risk-premium has to be included in the 
initial fee or salary. The standard reason for the principal to link remuneration 
to outcome is to provide incentives for the agent to put in the appropriate effort. 
The standard problem is that increasing incentives usually imply increased risk 
and the principal is typically assumed to be more able to shoulder this risk. If 
the principal is a large record label or producer and the agent a session 
                                                 
36 Section 78 CDPA 1988. 
37 Section 87 (2) CDPA 1988. 
38 In other words, the protection of the musical performance. See section 180 (2) CDPA 1988. 
39Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12/12/2006 on rental 
right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual 
property (codified version)Official Journal L376, 27.12.2006,28–35.  
40 See e.g. Joseph E. Stiglitz,“Principal and Agent (ii)”. In: Palgrave Macmillan (eds) The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan(2008), London. 
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musician, it would seem reasonable to assume that the former is better able to 
tolerate risk arising from unsure future incomes. Hence, absent any incentive 
problems, the risk faced by the music performers should be minimised. Placing 
more risk on musicians may incentivise them to play “better”, but arguably 
there are less costly means of achieving this since the effort is readily observable 
to the principal, who can take appropriate action. Moreover reputational effects 
may be very powerful in ensuring a high quality performance. From this 
perspective, it is difficult to identify the benefits for the performers from the EC 
Rental Directive. The EC Rental Directiveclearly increase the cost of managing a 
recording. Having to identify and keep track of a larger set of people entitled to 
a share of the rent generated add considerable transactions costs to the 
disbursement of moneys collected from recorded music. For standard 
transaction cost reasons the Directive strengthens the motivation for 
havinglarge established traditional intermediaries who can spread the costs of 
the disbursements across a large number of recordings.  
The legal beneficiary of performers’ rights is the performer of a 
particular musical performance. The rights can appear similar to the ones 
granted to right-holders of authorial works but they remain somewhat 
different. As such, performers have also a reproduction right, distribution right, 
rental and lending right, making available to the public right but they also have 
the right to equitable remuneration.41 Finally, performers also enjoy moral 
rights as described here above.42 
This brief description of the key copyright concepts is potentially 
misleading as it focuses on the UK copyright only. The previous section 
demonstrated that the evolution of music consumption strives towards more 
                                                 
41 For performers’ rights, see sections 182 – 182D CDPA 1988. 
42 See sections 205J (2), 205L and 205M CDPA 1988. 
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internationalisation. Therefore, it is important to take into consideration the 
domestic idiosyncrasies when analysing the UK music market but we also need 
to consider its international dimension and other countries’ variations which 
are especially relevant when dealing with assignment and licensing of 
copyright.43 
The key insight form this subsection is that, even without adding the 
international dimension, copyright is complex and compliance costly. This 
derives from the multi-layering of rights embodied in a single track and its 
inherent numerous right-holders. This in itself creates increasing returns to 
scale in the delivery of music from creator to consumer.However, original 
creators rarely remain the right-holders of their works. To maximise their 
chances of reward, generally right-holders transfer their copyrights to collecting 
rights societies which license music on the creators’ behalf and collect royalties 
deriving therefrom.  
3.2 Assignment and licensing of copyright 
To ensure remuneration and dissemination, most right-holders of authorial and 
entrepreneurial works assign (by selling) or license (by authorising) their 
copyrights to third parties. Adding a layer of complexity, a right-holder can 
decide to share these exclusive rights between several third parties.44 However 
in practice, these are often licensed collectively to specific bodies, arguably 
because of the complexity of the copyright system which creates large 
                                                 
43 Therefore, in addition to the international treaties mentioned in footnote n. 24 above, the US, 
French, German and Japan legal frameworks seem to be of particular importance for this 
creative industry because it adds to the complications of doing business and hence to 
transaction costs of different players. 
44 Section 90 CDPA 1988. 
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transaction costs.45 These collecting rights societies became increasingly 
important not only to help creators enforce their rights and collect royalties by 
granting licences but also in an ideal world to ensure correct distribution of 
these royalties.  
In the UK, right-holders of the composition, usually assign their 
performance and broadcasting rights to Performing Right Society (PRS) for 
Music which administers the licences of the works’ performances.46 In order to 
develop a record, the first copyright owner, generally publishers, can assign the 
right to record the work, known as the mechanical right. The right-holders of 
the musical works traditionally mandate the Mechanical Copyright Protection 
Society (MCPS)to administer these rights to reproduction. Hence, whoever 
wants to record music must seek prior authorisation from MCPS. The royalties 
are then, redistributed to the copyright owners. As mentioned earlier, the rights 
in the sound recording are initially granted to the producer. In the UK, record 
companies employing these producers usually assign the exclusive rights to 
Phonographic Performance Limited (PPL) to, for example, broadcast (which 
includes Internet transmission) the works or to authorise somebody else to 
make another recording including the original record (also known as 
synchronisation rights). As noted by Greenfield and Osborn, exclusivity is key 
in the music industry.47 These authors explain how music industry players try 
to acquire exclusive control over creators and their outputs for at least as long 
                                                 
45 See e.g. Ariel Katz, “The potential demise of another natural monopoly: Rethinking the 
collective administration of performing rights” (2005) 1(3)Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics541-593. 
46 As the owner of copyrights, PRS for Music can also either exercise the rights in the work itself 
or transfer these to a third party such as a publisher or other collecting society. Once a 
member of PRS for Music, the original copyright holder assigns the copyright subsisting in 
the current work together with the copyrights in future works.  
47 S. Greenfield and G. Osborn, ‘Copyright law and power in the music industry’ in S. Firth and 
L. Marshall (eds), Music and copyright (Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 96. 
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as they are successful. In standard contracts, musicians exclusively license all 
exploitation of rights throughout the world during copyright protection to a 
label to ensure that all present and future performances can be identified and 
monetised.Efficient contracting among all those who are involved in producing 
music, which ensures that the rent extracted from the consumers of music is 
distributed in a fair manner and which keeps control over pricing among a few 
key players benefit those in the industry at the cost of consumers. 
Consequently, contract law also plays a crucial role and contractual terms need 
to be carefully negotiated. These can take different forms: licence, exclusive 
long term recording contract, development deals, production deals and the 
most recent 360° model.48 
In the changing technological and digital landscape, revenue is still 
generated. However, the ways in which the music industry generates revenues 
is adjusted. Firstly, there is an increase of ‘standard terms’, meaning that one 
party (e.g. the publisher or record company) imposes terms on the other party 
(e.g. the creator) who must either accept or refuse the standard terms.49 This 
facilitates intermediaries to protect their interests in the music industry value 
chain.50 Secondly, some costs have been reduced with digitalisation. As 
discussed below, with the emergence of streaming, music distribution does not 
require copying music on a tangible format.51The risk for a record company of 
                                                 
48A. Harrison, Music: the business (6th ed., Random House, 2014) 73-89; M. Kretschmer, GM. 
Klimis and R. Wallis, ‘The Changing Location of Intellectual Property Rights in Music: A 
Study of Music Publishers, Collecting Societies and Media Conglomerates’ (1999) 17 
Prometheus: Critical Studies in Innovation, 178; P.B. Hugenholtz, ‘Adapting copyright to the 
information superhighway’ in The Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment (Kluwer Law 
International, 1996), 84. 
49 L. Guibault, Copyright and contracts: An analysis of the contractual overridability of limitations on 
copyright (Kluwer, 2002), 205.  
50 R. Wallis, ‘Copyright and the composer’ in S. Firth and L. Marshall (eds), Music and Copyright 
(Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 110.  
51 See infra section 4.1. 
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being left with unsold stock is reduced as they can manufacture fewer physical 
records (e.g. CDs) without adverse effects on unit costs. The internet opens new 
possibilities for creators to produce and distribute their music independently of 
intermediaries (or traditional intermediaries) such as record labels or 
publishers. As retaining the production and distribution roles can be very costly 
in terms of time and effort, creators may still prefer to sign a contract with 
traditional music publishers, but the option is there for the more 
entrepreneurial creators. New intermediaries have also increased the ability for 
creators to self-produce their music and self-publish their work via online 
intermediaries which enable direct interaction with consumers. Examples are 
Patreon, which organises a form of fan-funding by helping creators run a 
membership business and Bandcamp, which acts as a direct sales site. The 
digital environment empowers independent creators and labels to enter the 
market independently as an alternative to handing exclusive rights over to the 
established intermediaries such as labels, record companies and collecting 
societies. In theory, record labels have lost their monopoly on the gatekeeper 
role as they are not solely responsible for deciding the music that consumers 
could listen to. With the distribution of musical content now available to 
everyone, consumers might be able to make the decision as to the works they 
want to listen to.The key effect of the recent changes is that the value added by 
record labels and publishers is much reduced and that ought to translate into 
both less use and less profitable terms for the intermediaries. Who benefits the 
most from this, creators, retailers or consumers, is less obvious. 
Digitalisation has made the market for music more global. In an attempt 
to increase transparency, good governance, and improve competition between 
collecting rights societies in the EU, the 2014 European Directive on the 
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collective management of copyright also aims at facilitating trans-border 
licensing of online music. 52 By facilitating online licensing of authorial works, it 
is believed that the consumer’s position will significantly be improved by the 
availability of a large and more diverse repertoire of music throughout the 
European Union. Imposing new standards of transparency for right-holders, 
the directive modernises the organisation and management of collecting rights 
societies to ensure that right-holders have a say in how their rights are being 
managed to maximise their chances at financial returns. 
Overall, we note that the traditional copyright paradigm relies on 
intermediaries (i.e. publishers and labels), capable of exploiting two sources of 
economics of scale, the technology related to production and delivery of music 
and the transactions costs arising from copyright law, to control and distribute 
the physical content comprising the creative content. In the digital era, the role 
of these traditional intermediaries is being questioned as the technological 
argument for such scale is reduced. The question raised about copyright is 
currently less about its effect through complexity on market structure and more 
about its adequacy in ensuring that creators derive adequate royalties from P2P 
or streaming services. 
In recent years, the main debate focused on securing revenue streams 
from the increasingly powerful platforms disseminating music online. As we 
have seen Spotify and other subscription-based services secure licences with 
right-holders. Currently, it is believed that Spotify pays around 70% of its 
revenues to right-holders. This share is further divided between record labels 
                                                 
52Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26February 2014 on 
collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of 
rights in musical works for online use in the internal marketOJ L 84, 20.3.2014, p. 72–98; 
transposed in the UK by The Collective Management of Copyright (EU Directive) 
Regulations 2016. 
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(55-60%) and publishers (10-15%). It would be erroneous to believe that this 
amounts to the share received by artists. Typically, the right-holders are 
collecting rights societies, record labels and publishers to whom the artist will 
have transferred the copyright. Artists will nevertheless perceive the royalties 
distributed by the right-holders.  
3.3 Towards subscription-based models 
Following the utilitarian justification of copyright, copyright legislation 
establishes a system to promote creation and dissemination of works against 
financial reward. Traditionally, this system has mostly benefited the 
intermediaries through the transfer (or license) of the exclusive rights from 
composition creators to organisations administering these rights on their behalf 
against a percentage. Just like composition creators, creators of sound 
recordings are also granted exclusive rights which they can in turn transfer or 
license to record labels which will administer these rights on their behalf. 
This paradigm is altered in the 21st century. The advent of technologies, 
with the rise of online music distribution, disrupted the music ecosystem to the 
extent that commentators question the current copyright system and its 
adequateness to provide incentives given the difficulty of rights administration 
and enforcement of copyright in the digital world.53 Digitalisation and 
disintermediation, making it possible to side-line publishers, may also have 
exacerbated the differences between different groups of creators. This is 
particularly apparent in the attitudes towards free downloads or streaming and 
even piracy. Digitalisation also has the capacity to alter the size and nature of 
transactions costs. The same is true of copyright laws. Since organisational 
structures as well as industry structures to a significant extent are driven by the 
                                                 
53Supra n. Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
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saving of transaction costs (e.g. the raison d’être for the collecting societies), the 
interplay between digitalisation and copyright may be important. In the light of 
that, questioning the suitability of current copyright laws and the way in which 
they are used may be warranted. Is it possible to simplify the law to reduce 
transaction costs while maintaining its core functions? Will the combination of 
future technology and copyright rules enable creators to look after themselves, 
or would interventions ensuring that creators and performers receive a fair 
remuneration be more effective? 
4 The Market structure 
In this context of technological changes and increasing reliance on copyright 
legislation by industry players, the question remains as to how these changes 
affect the music industry at large, especially intermediaries. Do creators still 
rely as much as before on collecting rights societies, publishers and record 
labels given that technology decreased production costs and that creators are 
able to sell directly music to consumers online?  
4.1 Revenue sharing inthe UK music industry in the pre-online 
music distribution era 
In the previous section, we established that the copyright paradigm is the 
centre-piece of the music industry. It establishes a system which aims at 
fostering creation and dissemination of the new works created by providing 
right-holders with exclusive rights to control and exploit the copyright-
protected works. In so doing, the role of copyright constitutes the bargaining 
chip for record labels. By transferring their exclusive rights to intermediaries, 
creators are entitled to royalties which aims at promoting the creation of new 
works. 
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To understand the impact of digitalisation on the music industry and the 
market structure, it is helpful to understand how royalties, derived from the 
reproduction and distribution of the sound recording, were calculated in the 
pre-digital era.54 In the UK, royalties are calculated by taking the CD wholesale 
price multiplied by the royalty rate (which is traditionally specified in the 
contract between the creator and the record label). However, these calculations 
are affected by two considerations: the packaging deduction and the reserve. 
The packaging deduction essentially deals with the cost of delivering the music 
to the retailer and is based on the philosophy that the creator should only be 
entitled to royalties deriving from the sales of the record or CD. The reserve 
refers to an amount of the income, to which the creator is entitled, which is kept 
back until an agreed sales volume has been reached. The motivation for this is 
that recording and manufacturing a record or CD is costly and this cost is sunk, 
that CD are sold on a 100% return basis and demand is uncertain. Hence, 
marketing a record or CD is risky. This risk naturally varies depending on the 
CD and the creator and hence so does the reserve, Passman reports that the 
reserve usually fluctuates between 20-30% and between 5-15% for more 
established creators.55 
The first and obvious point to make is that both the deduction and the 
reserve are a phenomenon purely related to physical sales – with digital 
delivery, both disappear. Secondly, allowing for some costs to be deducted 
before sharing has the effect of moving the remuneration for the creator from a 
pure revenue share to a partial profit share. Moreover, the reserve amounts to a 
degree of risk sharing between creator and record label. Taken together, these 
                                                 
54 D. S. Passman, All you need to know about the music business (Penguin books, 2011), 63-82, 
particularly, 77. 
55Ibid. 
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two deductions from the royalties have the effect of making the creator more of 
a residual claimant alongside the record label, with similar incentives, but 
without any decision-making powers which often accompany such 
partnerships. If the creator is already taking some of the risk and paying for 
some of the costs, it may appear a small step to resume full responsibility. 
4.2 The music industry in the online music distribution era 
The rise of online music distribution disrupted this ecosystem and especially, 
the role of record labels. In a world where consumers relied heavily on tangible 
media to access music, record labels constituted important capital-providing 
intermediaries.56 This essential role is being questioned in the online 
environment given the significant reduction of the upfront costs for bringing 
music onto the market. In 2017, the IFPI Digital Music Report noted that in 
2016, the new online music models account for more than half of industry 
revenues (having overtaken the share of physical works already in 2015).57 
The market shares for physical and digital music over the period 2008-
2016 is fairly stable, with a small set of major labels and a large set of 
independent labels. The main overall change has been the merger between EMI 
and Universal Media Group, which reduced the set of major labels to three. The 
market share of the independents over that period is summarised in figure 1 
below: 
                                                 
56Ibid. 
57IFPI, Digital Music Report (2017), available at http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/GMR2017.pdf.  
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Figure 1: Market share of independent labels 2008-201658 
 
Source: Music and Copyright blog, available at https://musicandcopyright.wordpress.com/. 
 
One trend is worth noting: while both submarkets are very concentrated, 
independents have a larger share of the physical market, leaving the digital 
submarket relatively more concentrated. However, as the value of that segment 
has decreased over time, this may simply reflect that the large labels are less 
focused on that segment. Analysis of Music Business Worldwide of the 
performances of the three largest labels, based on their annual reports, supports 
this. While physical revenues declined (slightly) for all three groups, revenue 
from digital grew by from 32% to 43%. The continuing dominance of the big-3, 
particularly in digital markets, is noteworthy.59This level of concentration may 
imply that less is passed on from record labels to creators, increasing the 
incentive for the creators to take full control of the recordings. 
                                                 
58 The data for 2017 are not comparable with the past data as Music & Copyright’s 2017 review 
of their music publishing share methodology, see their May 15 2018 blog, 
https://musicandcopyright.wordpress.com/2018/05/15/umg-and-wmg-make-recorded-
music-market-share-gains-sony-outperforms-in-publishing/. The new methodology finds a 
larger market share for the independents and a smaller market share for in particular UMG 
and WMG. The overall market shares for 2016 and 2017 using the new methodology appear 
largely stable. 
59 See: https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/major-labels-revenues-grew-1bn-2017-
biggest-year/ 
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An alternative to using a record label to distribute your music has 
emerged in recent years. There are currently a large number of such services, 
including Amuse,AWAL, CD Baby,DistroKid, Ditto Music, Fresh Tunes, Horus 
Music,Landr,MondoTunes,OneRPM,ReverbNation,RouteNote,Soundrop, Stem, 
Symphonic andTunecore. These digital distribution companies help those 
musicians who chose to record and produce their own music, so calledDIY 
musicians, getting their music onstreaming platforms (digital service 
providers). The future of these is also the ability to collect royalties by the DIY 
musicians themselves.60 While some of these services have been active for 
decades (CD Baby was founded in 1998), this is a developing area which in the 
longer term has the potential to enable DIY musicians to sidestep both record 
labels and collecting societies. For this they clearly benefit from having new 
entrants in the retail market, such as Amazon, who are used to retail on behalf 
of small firms and even individuals. 
Both the labels and self-recording creators need to retail music whether it 
is in the form of a physical product or a digital file for downloading or 
streaming. While some brick & mortar stores remain, in particular the chain 
store HMV, the number of independent stores has decreased as they have 
become niche outlets. Overall brick & mortar retail accounts for about a third of 
the sales revenues in the UK. The main channels for retail distribution are either 
on-line retailers or streaming services. BPI statistics61 show that for the UK, 
streaming outstripped sales of digital singles (downloads) for the first time in 
2014. This was both due to a steep growth in streaming and partly to the sales 
                                                 
60 See http://aristake.com/post/cd-baby-tunecore-ditto-mondotunes-zimbalam-or for a review of 
these, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses. 
61 Reported in blogpost “Amazon overtook Apple as UK’s biggest music retailer last year” on 
Music Business Worldwide on 16/07/ 2015, see 
http://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/amazon-sold-more-music-than-apple-in-the-uk-
last-year/.  
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of digital singles levelling off. At the same time the sale of physical albums and 
singles continued its sharp decline. This, in itself, points to a shift away from 
brick and mortar stores. If one looks at sales by major retailers for 2015, 
Amazon (27.0%) and Apple (26.7%) between them have more than half the 
music retail market in the UK, the specialist chain-store HMV had 15.4%, the 
major supermarkets 17.0% and remaining outlets had 13.9%. The Herfindahl 
measure of concentration at the retail level is around 0.18. This corresponds to 
having an industry with between 5 and 6 retailers of similar size. As the data 
look across retailers with very different profiles, this has clearly become a 
concentrated part of the market. 
While central download-based models remain popular, their popularity 
seems to be rapidly declining, the music download market-share of 84.4% of the 
digital music market in 2010 has shrunk to 34.9% in 2016.62 Following the 
Napster saga, major record labels launched their own online music store, e.g. 
Sony Music Entertainment and Universal Music Group teamed up to launch 
‘Pressplay’; EMI, AOL/Time Warner and Bertelsmann Music Group teamed up 
to launch ‘MusicNet’. These services did not do so well given the limitations 
attached to what users’ experience. While these services struggled to take off, 
the demand for mainstream digital audio download led to the launch of iTunes 
Store, which linked to the iPod technology led to the growth of the music 
download market as users could download music directly onto their portable 
devices. Very quickly, other services emerged. For example, creators developed 
their own online music stores by embedding digital distribution widgets onto 
                                                 
62 The UK recorded music market in a long-term perspective, 1975-2016, available at: 
https://musicbusinessresearch.wordpress.com/2017/07/30/the-uk-recorded-music-market-in-
a-long-term-perspective-1975-2016/ 
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their website to sell their music directly to consumers.63 These direct-to-fans 
(D2F) platforms consist of a business model which inherently gets rid of the 
middle man by allowing creators to deliver music directly to fans, in the hope 
of allowing them to keep a higher percentage of their sales.  
From the perspective of platform services, a big difference relates to the 
type of licence needed. Typically, non-interactive platforms are slightly 
privileged as these benefit from compulsory licenses, interactive (on-demand) 
services are subject to voluntary licenses, affecting their bargaining power vis-à-
vis the record labels. Streaming services have a lot in common with radio 
stations and yet, the licensing of these platforms is much more burdensome 
than for radio stations. Taking the example of an interactive subscription 
streaming service, such service needs to obtain a licence from collecting rights 
societies for the use of the copyright-protected composition and for the sound 
recording. Therefore, not only does an interactive online service need to get a 
mechanical licence for the reproduction of the sound recording, but also for the 
protected authorial works embodied in the sound recording. Given that there is 
no statutory rate, these licensing fees are subject to negotiations, generally 
between MCPS (representing the right-holders and creators of the musical 
compositions) and the British Phonographic Industry (BPI) representing the 
record labels. In addition, the online music distribution service needs to clear 
the performance and communication to the public rights. This means that the 
platform needs to get a licence from PRS for Music and PPL. This fragmentation 
can be time consuming and burdensome for online music distribution services, 
especially when taking into consideration the need to get cross-border licensing. 
If having a full repertoire is valuable, it also has the potential for hold-up, 
                                                 
63 E.g. Bandbox, Bandcamp, Nimbit, Bandzoogle, Cash Music, MySpace, fm, Pledgemusic, 
ReverbNation, soundcloud, Songcast, Tunecore, Wazala and Topspin. 
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where the last to agree a licence extract a disproportionately good deal and all 
want to be last.64 However, changes are underway. PRS for Music and MCPS 
now license together to online music services.65 Additionally, resulting from a 
partnership between PRS for Music, STIM and GEMA, an integrated licensing 
hub (known as ICE) was launched in 2016 to facilitate multi-territory licensing 
of works within the EU territory, providing a real pan-European online music 
rights licensing hub.66 Reported statistics focus on various subsets of services 
and there appears to be no settled market definition. Finding market share data 
in streaming is difficult, but most business analysts suggest that there is a small 
number of dominant firms; however, the markets are very fluid. 
The consequences for the creators are yet fully to be played out. The 
album does not represent the market anymore. While the pre-digital market 
could be measured by looking at the average income per album, the streaming 
market is measured by the value per user. To remedy the licensing and royalty 
issues, the best way to measure this market is perhaps to measure the average 
amount earned per album/track per streaming user. Additionally, consumers 
seem to be more accustomed to paying for the access to a service rather than 
access to individual creators’ works. This reinforces the need for more 
transparency in the non-disclosure agreements signed between record labels (or 
collecting rights societies) and streaming services. In so doing, record labels 
often refuse to disclose the exact terms to the creators who may struggle to 
                                                 
64 The difficulty with getting licences for a comprehensive coverage is highlighted in Morten 
Hviid, Simone Schroff and John Street, “Regulating CMOs by competition: an incomplete 
answer to the licensing problem?” (2016)7 JIPITEC 256-270. [previouslyCREATe Working 
Paper 2016/03]. 
65 The breakdown can be found at: 
http://www.prsformusic.com/creators/memberresources/mcpsroyalties/mcpsroyaltysources/
onlineandmobile/jol/pages/jol.aspx. 
66 More information about this new venture can be found at: 
https://www.prsformusic.com/iceservices/Pages/default.aspx. 
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unravel the price at which their creative endeavour is being sold.67 Hence, it is 
essential for featuring and non-featuring creators to include a provision in their 
recording contract with the record labels providing for the distribution of 
royalty shares deriving from any form of streaming. The difficulty with these 
agreements, between interactive services and record labels, is that these are 
largely confidential, thereby reducing the bargaining power of the creator.   
To adapt to the digital era, record labels have consolidated some earlier 
roles and acquired others. For example, record labels are essential for marketing 
and promotion of music. Indeed, given the mass dissemination of works over 
the Internet, consumers face an overabundance of choices and there are 
indications that consumers increasingly want to be told what music they are 
likely to enjoy without actually searching for it. To do so, record labels play a 
crucial role in ensuring that the music is present on various online music 
distribution services, is played on relevant radio programmes and obtain 
appropriate press coverage. These roles will become increasingly important if 
the licensing of online music is simplified, resulting in the entry of new 
platforms in the market. 
Services like Spotify tend to focus on maximising their growth and 
popularity at the expense of short-term profit. The value of a streaming 
platform to the artist is in a combination of the number of streams and the 
amount paid per stream.68 The former depends on the size of the subscription 
base. The latter depends on how important the piece of music is to the platform. 
Consumers prefer a streaming service that offers the best combination of cost 
(fee or adverts) and coverage of music. Depending on how the platform obtains 
                                                 
67https://basca.org.uk/public-affairs/thedaythemusicdied/.  
68 As noted in footnote 6, the streaming services with the larger market share pay the lower 
amount per stream. 
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its revenue, it prefers a large number of users (advertising) or subscribers (fees). 
In other words this is a multi-sided market, and as we know, the pricing on 
such markets is complex, but the side which is most important to the platform 
tends to get the better deal. The only way to increase the artists’ revenue seems 
to be to either increase the number of ads on freemiums or to increase the 
monthly subscription based on an online music service. The problem is that this 
will deter some deals with potential advertisers or drive away the consumer to 
another service whilst the second option is likely to decelerate the growth of the 
platform as a whole which goes against their current business model. 
In conclusion, re-intermediation’69 in the music industry has begun on 
two accounts. Firstly, traditional intermediaries such as collecting societies and 
record labels are adapting to the digital economy and new intermediaries 
emerge such as the various online streaming services, mimicking physical 
distribution of music. Secondly, digital aggregators emerged as new 
intermediaries,70 providing services to supply creative content in the 
appropriate digital formats to the digital retailers. Crucially, both the record 
company level and the retail level is now best characterised as concentrated 
oligopolies. Although there is some evidence that some consumers multi-home, 
using streaming to identify new creators but then wanting to purchase physical 
copies of the creators they like,71 the fragmentation is likely to reduce 
competition. The consumer response to reduced competition is harder to gauge, 
                                                 
69 For more on intermediation, disintermediation and re-intermediation in the record industry, 
see Bernardo F. and Martins L. G., ‘Disintermediation effects in the music business – a return 
to old times?’ (2013) available at 
https://musicbusinessresearch.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/bernardo_desintermediation-
effects-in-the-music-business.pdf. 
70 Harrison, supra n. 48, 188, argues that this results in a shift of dynamics, empowering the 
creators and away from traditional record labels.  
71 BPI, “Music fans deliver verdict on digital versus physical: it’s not either/or – it’s 
BOTH!”,AudienceNet study, https://www.bpi.co.uk/home/music-fans-deliver-verdict-on-
digital-versus-physical-its-not-eitheror-its-both.aspx, December 2015. 
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because multi-homing may be viewed as costly. The convenience of a one-stop-
shop may hence outweigh any increase in the price for the service. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we demonstrated how the value chain structure of the music 
record industry evolved (and still does). Changes have been manifold. Firstly, 
at retail level, digital downloads have contributed significantly to the delivery 
of music to consumers but this is being overtaken by the growth of streaming.72 
While it is recognised that some consumers might prefer obtaining a physical 
copy, this may be less about consuming music and more about owning a 
collectible. Therefore, whether one considers digital and physical music as 
complements or substitutes depends on consumer preferences and on how 
supply (music available) is presented to the consumer. With an ever-expanding 
repertoire, consumers require new ways of navigating through this long tail. 
This explains the growing consumer interest is services which identify the 
content they are likely to want to access without the need for them to look for 
the content. Secondly, at production level, Richard Caves’ centre of gravity of 
the nexus of contracts73 theoretically appears to have moved from record labels 
and publishers to intermediaries such as streaming platforms. In Caves’ model, 
record labels and publishers were at the centre of contracts because they bore 
the most risks and gained rewards as residual claimants of the stream of 
revenues generated. Our research demonstrates the rise of disintermediated 
vertical services which displaced the centre of contracts towards internet service 
                                                 
72According to a music industry blog, the share of label revenues for streaming was 34% in 2016 
(23% in 2015), see https://musicindustryblog.wordpress.com/2017/02/26/global-recorded-
market-music-market-shares-2016/. 
73 Richard E. Caves, Creative industries: Contracts between Arts and Commerce”, Harvard 
University Press (2000), chapter 4. 
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providers (ISPs). Today, these intermediaries are essential for the distribution of 
digital music to consumers. Even further, with the rise of apps, there is a 
theoretical possibility of bypassing (some) intermediaries, allowing content 
creators to sell music directly to consumers. This, consequently, places the 
content creator at the centre of contractual relationships. Content creators (with 
the right project management skills) can plausibly by-pass traditional 
intermediaries to deal directly with music retailers or consumers. The threat of 
“going it alone” is likely to lead creators to obtain better terms with publishers 
and record labels if they choose to deal with these established intermediaries. 
How effective this threat to by-pass traditional intermediaries is likely to be, 
depends on a number of issues beyond the scope of this paper, including any 
possible reforms to copyright laws, the creation of an open source database of 
music and the future structure and behaviour of the CMOs. The current 
copyright rules which have entrenched complexities into the way which the 
revenue generated from the rights are distributed support the status quo of 
powerful industry actors. A reset where copyrights are taken back to the basic 
premise of protection moral rights and offering adequate incentives for talented 
individuals to engage in creative endeavours is likely to affect participants in 
the music industry, such as the established intermediaries, established and new 
artists and consumes, differently. Any adverse effects from a reduction in 
market power are likely to be experienced by the established intermediaries 
and the established artists, leaving the users and potentially new artists as the 
main beneficiaries. Given the lobbying strength of these different interest 
groups, such a reset does not seem likely. 
Without further reforms, one might reasonably expect established 
creators to be better off financially with the new digital structures, thus having 
a greater incentive to create. The change in structure is considerably less likely 
to lead to a better deal for the consumers. A greater level of concentration at 
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several successive vertical levels combined with increased bargaining power of 
established creators is theoretically likely to increase the upwards distortion of 
prices for their music.74 The effect on the less established and new creators is 
unclear. While they do have the option to promote themselves through several 
of the ISPs, the long tail makes this ever more challenging. Whether current 
structures and regulations support the weaker parties in this market remains an 
open question. 
What is the role of record labels in digital music distribution? After all, 
the costs of manufacturing and distributing records have drastically declined. 
So far, these intermediaries act as ‘gatekeepers’ as the licensing deals have to be 
negotiated on a case-by-case basis and there is no statutory fee. Consequently, 
the ‘middle-man’ is not dead in the digital world. Yet, roles are displaced. As 
the streaming services have grown in the number of subscribers they have 
signed up, so has their market power.75 This has enabled the large streaming 
service providers to complete copyright agreements with the major record 
labels. This does not automatically imply that creators are better off. As we 
have noted, record labels are not obliged to redistribute the income to the 
creators unless this has been included in a provision of the recording contract. 
And even where the contract does provide for the distribution of revenue, the 
royalty rate is generally low given the inequality in bargaining powers. 
Streaming services are often accused of low pay rates to creators. However, 
                                                 
74 The theoretical argument would be along the lines that an increase in creator bargaining 
power would raise the costs to the record labels and publishers. Because of their market 
power they will in turn add a mark-up to these increased costs, leading to an increase in 
wholesale prices. This in turn, with a more concentrated retail level, leads to a further mark-
up of the higher wholesale price to yield a higher price to the consumer.  
75 At the moment, as argued above, growth is in terms of subscribers new to streaming. As the 
market becomes saturated, growth for an individual streaming service will have to come 
from converting the subscribers of other services. How that will alter the bargaining power 
both between streaming service providers and labels, and streaming services and consumers 
remains to be seen.  
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there is some merit in arguing that these low royalty rates are derived from the 
fragmentation of copyright and the complex licensing agreements, leading to 
higher transaction costs. The recent changes in the music industry and the ones 
yet to come, may remedy this situation in order to create a competitive and 
sustainable streaming market.  
 
